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The Distribution of Fixed Capital 
in the Multinational Firm
ALEXANDER LEHMANN*
Based on industry-level data for majority-owned U.S. foreign affiliates in 49 coun-
tries, this paper identifies the determinants of the cross-country distribution of
fixed capital within multinational companies. Controlling for market size and
trade openness, it is shown that U.S.-owned capital stocks are high in countries
with a history of high profitability and low earnings variability. Similarly, the
formation of fixed capital is encouraged in host countries with low variable costs,
low political risks, and open trade regimes. At the same time, capital expenditures
in the late 1990s appear to be insensitive to contemporaneous changes in risk and
market shares, underlining investors’ sluggish response to the changing charac-
teristics of their host markets.  These findings underline the importance of risk in
deterring fixed capital expenditures in—and by implication capital flows to—
developing countries. [JEL F21, D81]
D
espite the high share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in private capital
flows to developing countries—on average about 53 percent over the years
1995–2000—the uneven distribution of FDI across developing countries is still
only poorly understood.1 The period since the mid-1980s has witnessed the rapid
liberalization of investment regimes, yet in many low income countries the
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1The average share is based on net long-term flows in World Bank (2000a and b).response by foreign direct investors has been little more than lackluster.2 In part as
a result of this disappointing outcome, governments increasingly resort to costly
investment incentives, either in the form of fiscal measures or by granting prefer-
ential access to their markets. 
This paper examines the distribution of fixed capital expenditures by multinational
companies, which provide insights into the determinants of investment decisions that
are as important as those derived from the FDI flows that are almost exclusively
studied in the empirical literature. The results demonstrate that country-specific risk,
emanating from political uncertainty, plays a significant role in explaining the distri-
bution of foreign investment activity. The paper thereby sheds some light on the poten-
tial role of multilateral agreements that render national investment regimes more
predictable, as is currently being discussed within the World Trade Organization.
These findings represent an important extension of previous work on the
geographic distribution of foreign direct investment, as existing theory of the
multinational enterprise has not taken the effects of country risk into account. One
strand of the literature postulates the conjunction of ownership-specific advan-
tages, internalization benefits, and of certain location factors as necessary condi-
tions for the presence of multinationals.3 The second and more recent set of
theoretical articles has integrated multinational firms in the general equilibrium
theory of international trade under imperfect competition.4 However, recent
advances in the theory of investment that specifically model the effects of risk
have not yet been incorporated. Inadequate theory is reflected in ambiguous
empirical results. Schneider and Frey (1985), for instance, found a significant
negative relationship between FDI flows and political instability as measured by
the number of political strikes and riots. By contrast, Wheeler and Mody (1992)
found that country risk variables are insignificant in explaining the country distri-
bution of capital expenditures by U.S.-owned affiliates in a sample of 41 industri-
alized and developing countries. More recently, Wei (2000) confirmed the adverse
effect of corruption on FDI, and Henisz (2000) examined the effect of political risk
on the market entry mode of multinationals. 
Empirical work in this area is relevant for a better understanding not only of
private capital flows, but also of investment and growth in developing countries.
Recent growth theory portrays foreign direct investment as a means of technology
diffusion that enhances the variety of capital goods in the host economy, thereby
lowering the investment costs for domestic investors and stimulating domestic
investment and growth.5 Private investment in developing countries has attracted
considerable attention in the empirical literature.6 However, it is rarely noted that
in small developing countries foreign direct investment enterprises may account
for a substantial share of corporate capital formation. The determinants of capital
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2See, for instance, Emery and Spence (1999) for an account of how bureaucratic delays have held
back FDI in Africa in the context of what on the surface appear to be liberal investment regimes. 
3Dunning (1993). 
4Markusen (1995).
5Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and empirical studies in Borenzstein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1994)
and Fry (1993). 
6Blejer and Khan (1984) or Greene and Villanueva (1991). expenditures by this important subgroup of investors is the subject of only two
comparable empirical studies known to this author.7
I. Investment by U.S. Multinationals in Developing Countries 
For an analysis of the effects of the host country policy environment—and more
specifically of risk—on the investment activity of multinational companies, capital
expenditures by foreign affiliates rather than FDI represent the relevant dependent
variable. It is the formation of fixed, and in large part irreversible, capital that
gauges the expansion of foreign-owned production capacity, and that is most
likely to reflect the deterrent effects of an uncertain macroeconomic and regula-
tory environment in the host country.
Despite its importance for capital flows to and for domestic investment and
growth in the host economy, only a handful of articles have attempted an empir-
ical analysis. As is common in the research on the multinational enterprise, this is
mainly due to a lack of sufficiently comprehensive data. The statistics on capital
expenditures by majority-owned foreign affiliates (MoFAs) of U.S. companies
published by the U.S. Commerce Department are the only comprehensive source
for this variable (see the Appendix for data sources and definitions). By limiting
the analysis to majority-owned foreign affiliates, several alternative ways in which
multinational companies access foreign markets are omitted. To the extent that
host country risk induces, for instance, joint ventures or licensing, rather than
operations in which the investor has managerial control, the effects found here will
understate the impact of risk on multinational involvement. 
It is likely that the preoccupation in the literature with FDI flows has obscured
many empirical relationships. Foreign direct investment represents the provision of
capital—in the form of equity, debt, and reinvested earnings—from foreign
investors to enterprises that they control but that are domiciled in the host country.
FDI is, therefore, no more than a change in the intra-firm liabilities of the foreign
affiliate’s balance sheet. Such financing could be used for several purposes other
than capital formation, such as the acquisition of existing enterprises, of intangible
assets, or for trade finance.8 The balance sheets of U.S. affiliates are indeed highly
liquid, with net fixed capital accounting for no more than 17 percent of total assets.9
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7Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Stevens (1994). Gross foreign direct investment inflows account for
up to 30 percent of private investment in a number of developing countries. However, the relevant
comparator would be capital formation in the corporate sector, which is typically between a third and
one half of total private investment. 
8UNCTAD (2000), however, notes that even if all corporate acquisitions in developing countries
were financed through FDI, acquisitions would account for no more than 40 percent of total FDI flows
to developing countries. Greenfield investment is therefore regarded as the predominant motive for FDI
in developing countries. 
9This surprisingly small ratio is for all industries and was calculated as the ratio of net property, plant
and equipment over total assets net of equity investments in other affiliates. The ratio for world manu-
facturing affiliates is 28 percent. This figures includes fixed assets held by indirectly owned foreign affil-
iates, as long as the ultimate U.S. equity participation exceeds 50 percent. The ratio is higher in emerging
markets at about 35 percent (based on Bureau of Economic Analysis Tables III B3 and III B1 “Balance
Sheets of Affiliates,” industry by account and country by account, 1998).Conversely, capital formation by the foreign affiliate need not necessarily be
financed through the parent company. Other financing sources could be deprecia-
tion charges, capital markets in the host economy, or in third countries.
Figure 1 demonstrates that the correlation between the two variables is in no
way perfect. Up to 1991, capital expenditures by U.S. MoFAs exceeded total U.S.
FDI flows by a significant margin. In a number of years when FDI financing
almost dried up entirely, U.S. foreign affiliates continued to invest, an observation
that is also underlined by the country shares presented in Table 1. The concentra-
tion of capital expenditures within the five largest emerging markets is signifi-
cantly larger for U.S. affiliates in the manufacturing sector. In sum, the magnitude
of—and trends in—FDI flows to a country may differ substantially from capital
expenditures by foreign affiliates located in that country.  
II. Determinants of Affiliate Capital Expenditures
The Capital Allocation Process in the Multinational Firm 
Like capital flows, the capital expenditures of foreign-owned affiliates are a function
of both “supply” factors in investor countries and of factors specific to the recipient
country. In a stylized view of the multinational firm’s capital budgeting process,
after-tax profits and the required dividend payout ratio determine the following
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Figure 1. Alternative Measures of U.S. Affiliate Investment, 1982–98,
23 Developing Countries
(in billions of U.S. dollars)*
*Capital expenditures are for majority-owned foreign affiliates only.
Source: U.S. Commerce Department.period’s reinvested earnings. Once the debt-equity ratio is set for the entire multina-
tional group, the funds available for capital expenditures are fully determined.10
This process would be consistent with the observation that the parent firm of
a multinational company typically extends a guarantee for the liabilities of its
foreign affiliates. In this case, the credit rating of the multinational firm is evalu-
ated on the basis of its consolidated balance sheet—in particular the debt-equity
ratio—which includes all assets and liabilities held by the foreign affiliates. To
maintain what is in most cases a privileged credit rating, the parent firm will hence
retain control over the financing and the asset expansion of its foreign affiliates. A
number of empirical studies have confirmed that affiliate capital expenditures are
indeed coordinated centrally by the parent firm, allowing only limited autonomy
for individual affiliates: a fixed total investment volume is allocated across all
existing foreign affiliates, based on the relative expected payouts in the various
host countries.11
Based on this capital allocation process, it is assumed that gross affiliate
capital expenditures in any one host country i are determined by two sets of vari-
ables: a vector of variables in U.S. and international markets w,a nd a vector of
host country variables hi. Let CPXw denote gross world capital expenditures by
U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates (hence excluding investment in the U.S.
home base) and CPXi those in host country i. CPSi, the share in world capital
expenditures attracted by country i, is then defined by the following identity and













Table 1. Shares in U.S. FDI Outflows to and Capital Expenditures 
by Majority-Owned U.S. Affiliates 
(in percent)
1983–86 1995–98
CPX FDI CPX FDI
20 OECD Countries 71.8 70.1 67.8 67.9
Sample of 23 Developing Countries 19.3 5.1 21.8 18.4
of which
Argentina 0.8 0.4 1.5 1.4
Brazil 3.7 1.2 4.1 5.0
Mexico 1.7 –0.7 2.8 4.0
China 0.3 0.4 1.7 1.1
Malaysia 1.1 –0.5 1.7 0.5
Source: U.S. Commerce Department.
10Feldstein (1994).
11Caves (1996).Clearly, the above assumption is restrictive. By omitting the correlation between
earnings in various host countries, this model will not be suitable to test the port-
folio theory of foreign investment, on which, in any case, no consensus exists in
the literature.12 Another implication is that, due to the exogeneity of CPXw,g ains
in the relative attractiveness of any one host country will come at the cost of all
other hosts. Here, a number of empirical studies have shown that host countries
indeed compete for inward investment: each country seeks to attract a larger share
of some fixed world total at the expense of other host locations.13
Host Country Determinants
The share of capital expenditures attracted by the individual host country can be
assumed to increase in expected profits and decrease in the expected variability of
profits derived from this location. The ex-ante risk to returns is in large measure a
function of country-specific risk—that is, the subjective probability assigned to
certain adverse events that are at least partly under the control of the host country
government. There are a number of issues surrounding the definition and measure-
ment of country risk, some of which are reviewed further below. For the moment,
consider the derivation of the desired capital stock and of desired net investment
based on the capital allocation process outlined above. 
Assume that there is zero covariance between assets in different countries.
This assumption may be justified in so far as shocks to earnings are due to polit-
ical risk, though it is more problematic for economic risk, which could spread to
a number of countries within a region. The parent firm’s utility function is
increasing in world profits π w and decreasing in their variance, denoted with σ
2
w.
Under the above assumptions utility is separable in the utilities derived from the
individual host countries and the portfolio allocation problem simplifies to:
(2)
(3)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate of fixed capital. If affiliate operations exhibit
constant returns to scale, the desired net capital stock K –i
t in host country i will be
proportional to the world market share s of the host location: s would be limited by
the size of the host market where trade barriers are high, but could be significantly
larger where affiliate sales are directed to export markets. The scaling function f
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12Agmon and Lessard (1977) argue that multinational companies serve as tools for diversification, a
finding that is disputed in Jacquillat and Solnik (1978).  
13Guisinger and Associates (1985) and Wheeler and Mody (1992).would be increasing in relative expected profits, and decreasing in ex-ante risk v,
each measured relative to the world average:
(4)
If risk and return were the same for all countries, desired capital stocks would be
distributed in line with market shares: f (1,1) = 1. Desired capital stocks will
deviate from this distribution given by market shares to the extent that a country
exhibits expected returns or risks different from the world average. 
If, in response to changing host country attributes, capital stocks adjust fully
to the steady state as represented by equation (4), desired net investment in an indi-
vidual host location will be:
(5)
The first term reflects the familiar supply side effects from the investor country
investment cycle in which country i participates in line with its market share and
risk-return characteristics. In addition, the investor will reallocate capital towards
those host locations whose market shares grow—for instance due to trade liberal-
ization—and to those whose risk-return characteristics become more attractive
relative to the rest of the world. Therefore, the implication of equation (5) is that
apart from variables that control for the levels of risk, profitability, and market
shares, the empirical specification should also include changes in the risk-return
characteristics and growth in market shares. This is a consideration that is typi-
cally absent from cross-country analyses of foreign direct investment flows. 
Multinational investment will react only sluggishly to changing host country
attributes and market growth, due to the considerable lags that are inherent in the
approval and implementation of foreign investment projects. However, it is
expected that over the four-year period for which the dependent variable will be
averaged these changes will have worked through. 
While equation (4) is based solely on the standard risk averse utility function,
the effects of country risk may be especially pronounced where the fixed invest-
ment of foreign affiliates is irreversible—the investment can only be liquidated at
considerable cost—but could be delayed to a later point in time. If the investor
delays his investment by one period, he loses the returns on his project during that
time but gains the option of doing what is right in the subsequent period, having
observed the outcome of an uncertain macroeconomic and regulatory environ-
ment. In this case, the cost of investment at an earlier point is the sum of sunk costs
and the option value of waiting. Investment in any one location may therefore be
more sensitive to risk than would be suggested by the usual portfolio approach. 
It is likely that the real option theory of investment has some relevance in the
case of direct investors’ fixed capital expenditures. Following an investment
approval by the host country authorities, the implementation of investment is often
delayed for many years. Moreover, direct investment in developing countries—
where country risk is particularly prominent—is predominantly market seeking:
I
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142in the case of U.S. affiliates, the share of sales directed to host country markets is
about two-thirds. Host country markets, however, can usually be accessed through
exports to unaffiliated parties, or through a simple wholesale operation. While this
may be less profitable, and impede many of the learning effects associated with a
commercial establishment in a foreign market, this alternative market access route
would only require a much lower fixed capital expenditure and would be subject
to much lower uncertainty. Changes to trade regimes are, for the most part,
governed by the provisions entered into under the auspices of the WTO, which
also offers recourse against noncomplying parties. It is this dichotomy in the risks
associated with alternative market access modes that will render market-seeking
direct investment especially sensitive to host country risk.14 Whether this is
merely due to higher costs of capital or to a real option effect can only be deter-
mined by examining the risk sensitivity of investment in sectors that are typically
associated with a large degree of irreversibility. 
III. Empirical Analysis
The Data
The sample comprises 49 host countries for which comprehensive data have been
disclosed by the U.S. Commerce Department. These countries accounted for 94
percent of total world capital spending in 1995–98 and can be considered the prin-
cipal “investment universe” of U.S. multinational companies.
Three dependent variables are examined: (i) PPQS, the host country’s share in
the net value of world property, plant, and equipment on the balance sheets of U.S.
majority-owned affiliates (here, as in all “world” totals, excluding the U.S. home
base); (ii) CPNS, the country share in net capital formation; and (iii) CPS, the host
country’s share in gross capital expenditures. All three dependent variables were
averaged over the period 1995–98. While the cross-country regressions reported
below will therefore omit any potentially interesting within-country effects, aver-
aging the dependent variables opens up greater sector-level detail. For CPS, the
country shares in U.S. gross capital formation, a total of 405 observations were
available in nine industrial sectors. Pooling the observations is also sensible in
economic terms, as the cross-country distribution of capital expenditures is inde-
pendent across sectors (affiliates in different sectors are managed by different
parent firms—in other words, holding firms that would simultaneously expand
assets in several sectors are the exception among U.S. firms). 
The right-hand-side variables need to control for risk, profitability, and market
shares, and for this purpose, two alternative approaches are employed. First, prof-
itability and variability in returns can be measured directly through the measures
for return on sales (ROS, or operating margin) and its variability. However,
observed profitability may itself be a function of risk. To avoid potential
collinearity effects, a second set of regressions therefore includes a proxy for the
variable costs of affiliate operations: WAGR is the wage rate paid by U.S. affiliates.
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14See Lehmann (1999) for a more detailed model. In principle, the market shares of U.S. affiliates in any one country could be
measured through their share in total world sales of U.S. affiliates. As this would
introduce an endogenous variable on the right-hand side, host country market size
is proxied through the host country share in world income (GDPS). 
Yet, scale economies may also arise through sales directed to markets outside
the host economy. The host economy’s openness to international trade will be
measured through two alternative variables: an index developed by the IMF that
measures the restrictiveness of the tariff and non-tariff barriers on a scale of 1–10
(10 being the most restrictive); and the more conventional measure of trade inten-
sity, defined as the sum of imports and exports over GDP (variable OPN). In the
regressions of gross capital formation, a more sector-specific openness variable
can be included: the share of affiliate sales directed to the local host country
market (denoted SL). While SL may potentially contain information from other
explanatory variables, most notably the relative wage rate and country risk, a
regression of SL on these two variables did not produce significant coefficients.
Finally, in the regressions of the gross investment shares CPS,d epreciation will be
controlled for by including the previous period’s stock of fixed capital, again in
proportion to the world total (PPQS). Except for the risk variables and relative
wage rates, all variables have been lagged by one period to avoid potential endo-
geneity problems (see the Appendix for data sources).
Measurement and Predictive Power of Country Risk Ratings
Among the control variables, a key issue will be the measurement of country risk
and the interpretation of its effects. Country risk is a subjective concept and is
inherently difficult to measure. A common approach is to average the rankings
assigned by international consultancy firms for individual aspects of the political
and regulatory environment. These indices can be rightly criticized for being
slightly removed from the reality in the individual country, which could be more
readily evaluated through surveys of those involved in local business. However,
these drawbacks are compensated for by the greater comparability across coun-
tries and the availability of a longer time series. The index of political risk that will
be used here (denoted PRISK) is from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) that aggregates 13 aspects of the political, legal, and regulatory environ-
ment. ICRG also publishes indices of financial and economic risk, though these
are highly correlated with those for political risk.15 The ICRG indices are the most
comprehensive and among the longest running.  
Given the rapid decline in expropriations of foreign-owned assets, international
investors are now mainly concerned with the stability of earnings. The empirical
literature now focuses on the effects of so-called “regulatory takings” and of
corruption that are inherent in the often highly discretionary investment policies in
developing countries. Foreign affiliate earnings could be affected by unexpected
revisions of a contract entered into with the host country government, or through
more subtle regulatory changes, new taxation, and the loss of intellectual property
Alexander Lehmann
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15See Lehmann (1999) for factors underlying these indices.rights protection. Corruption at the level of the local bureaucracy, of course, impedes
the day-to-day operations of both foreign- and domestically owned enterprises, but
may bias the market access decision of foreign firms away from a wholly owned
subsidiary, the subset of affiliates covered in the dependent variables. 
It is, of course, questionable whether subjective ex-ante risk assessments by
commercial providers indeed predict future variability in the earnings of foreign
investors. To examine this issue, earnings variability was computed as the stan-
dardized variability in return on sales and return on assets. Table 2 lists the results
of bivariate regressions on the three risk measures. While the coefficients for all
three risk indices are significant and negative as expected, the overall fit of all
three regressions is low (20 percent at most). Still, the fact that these risk indices
are widely used in the assessment of individual investment locations, nevertheless
justifies including them in the regressions below. 
Regression Results
Fixed capital stocks
In a first step, the cross-country distribution of net fixed capital stocks is esti-
mated, based on equation (4). For the basic sample of 49 countries, a history of
earnings observations going back to 1983 is available, and relative profitability
and risk have been proxied through the average levels of and variability in oper-
ating margins over the period 1983–94. All variables are in logs, and three coun-
tries with negative average earnings have been excluded. 
Regression 1 shows that, after controlling for relative market size, historical
profitability has a positive effect, and historical variability in returns has a nega-
tive effect on the host country’s share in net fixed capital. This result can also be
obtained, once the observed variability in returns is replaced by the average histor-
ical rating for political risk (regression 2, higher values of PRISK representing
lower risk). If the variability of returns is also included in regression 2, this vari-
able does not yield a significant coefficient. Similar results hold when a proxy for
the restrictiveness of the trade policy regime is included: as expected, after
controlling for all other determinants of capital stocks, more open markets attract
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Table 2. Bivariate Regression Coefficients of Standardized Variability 
in Returns on Risk Indices1
ROA ROS
Coeff. t-Stat. R2 Coeff. t-Stat. R2
Political Risk –0.02 –2.52 0.12 –0.08 –2.02 0.08
Economic Risk –0.06 –3.42 0.20 –0.25 –2.30 0.10
Financial Risk –0.03 –2.69 0.14 –0.14 –2.05 0.08
1Results of a bivariate regression with constant term. The dependent variable is computed as the
standard deviation of return on sales (assets) over the arithmetic average over the period 1983–98 in a
sample of 48 countries. The right-hand-side variables are the values of the three risk variables in 1983.a larger share of the fixed capital within multinational corporations (regression 3).
Regression 3 is robust to the inclusion of an alternative measure of trade openness
(the trade intensity) and to the inclusion of an alternative profitability measure
(ROA, the return on assets). 
Country shares in world net investment
Data for the book values of net investment stocks are, of course, plagued by the
well-known valuation problems, which are likely to obscure the effects of past
profitability and risk; this may explain why the results in Table 3 could not be
replicated for individual industrial sectors. Moreover, expectations may not be
stationary: while past earnings variability may deter foreign capital formation,
perceptions may change in the context of regulatory reform in the host country.
Hence, an analysis of flows—rather than stocks—is more likely to pick up
investors’ sensitivity to changing host country attributes. 
For the moment, ignore the last two terms in equation (5). Once changes in
host country market shares and in risk return attributes are left out, dividing the
equation by world net investment results in an equation that explains country
shares in net fixed capital formation (the dependent variable CPNS). The func-
tional specification for this variable is now the same as that used in Table 3. 
For the purposes of a comparison, regression 3 from the table above was run for
the country share in fixed capital (PPQS) and for CPNS. Table 4 shows that, with
the exception of the profitability measure ROS, all coefficient estimates for CPNS
lie within half a standard deviation of those for the previous regression. This simply
Alexander Lehmann
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Table 3. Regression Results for the Distribution of Net Fixed Capital Stocks,
1995–98 (t ratios under the coefficient estimates)
Dependent Variable: log(PPQS9598)
46 observations 1 2 3








Trade restr. index –0.249***
–3.710
R2 0.540 0.584 0.666reflects the high correlation between the cross-country distribution of net capital
expenditures and the distribution of net fixed capital in the previous period—on
average, about 88 percent in the 1990s. Still, changes in host country attributes and
growth in market shares may be important determinants of capital expenditures. To
test for this, changes in the political risk rating, the change in profitability, and the
change in trade openness were included in regression 3. None of these variables
yielded a significant coefficient, even when they were included individually. 
The unresponsiveness of net capital expenditures to the changing host-country
attributes—in particular, to the changing profitability and to the improvements in
country risk—is, of course, at odds with equation (4), support for which was found
in the regressions presented in Table 3. This apparent contradiction may be recon-
ciled in one of two ways. Firstly, regressing average investment on the difference
in profitability in two four-year periods may not adequately pick up the lag struc-
ture with which multinational companies react to changing performance in the
various host countries. Indeed, there is evidence that investors have continued
foreign investments that have proved unprofitable for a long time.16 Secondly, the
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Table 4. Regression Results for Country Shares in Net Capital and in Net
Capital Formation, 1995–98 (t ratios under the coefficient estimates)
Dependent Variable log PPQS9598 log CPNS9598 log CPNS9598
Independent Variables
log(ROS9194) 0.468** 0.352* 0.361*
2.389 1.983 1.779
log(PRISK94) 2.561** 2.269** 2.110*
2.469 2.035 1.692
log(GDPS9194) 0.759*** 0.724*** 0.739***
6.297 6.371 6.309








No. of observations 48 47 46
R2 0.614 0.601 0.600
16Gestrin, Knight, and Rugman (2000). apparent insensitivity to attribute changes may be evidence that past stocks of
fixed capital determine future profitability, along the lines suggested by Markusen
(1990) who hypothesized that direct investment may be self perpetuating due to a
reduction in the variable costs of production. This should, however, ultimately
show in the profitability measures that would justify continued investment. Both
explanations would call for a more in-depth time series analysis. 
Sector-specific regressions
Finally, the U.S. data can be exploited at the level of individual industrial sectors.
As depreciation charges are only available in aggregate for all industries, the
dependent variable is now CPS—the country share in gross investment—and the
depreciation effects are controlled for through the inclusion of the lagged stock of
fixed investment on the right hand side. Now a log linear form is no longer
sensible, and all variables are included in linear terms. 
Regression 1 in Table 5 reports the results of the regression that pools the
observations from the nine industrial sectors, with common coefficients for all five
independent variables and a common intercept. Trade openness is now proxied
through the lagged sector-specific share of local sales (SL9194j, with the suffix j
indicating a sector-specific variable). Significance and signs of the regression
results are as before, though due to the different specification, coefficient values
cannot be compared. To avoid potential collinearity effects (between risk, prof-
itability, and export shares) regression 2 again proxies openness through the lagged
trade share, and host country costs through the wage rate paid by U.S. affiliates.
Interestingly, this specification yields a significant coefficient for financial risk
(FRISK), though not for economic risk (ERISK; see regressions 2 b and c). Once
sector-specific coefficients are allowed for the lagged capital stock, coefficient esti-
mates are largely unchanged, and the overall fit is improved. Lastly, regression 4
tests whether the effects of host country risk differ by industry. Of the nine coeffi-
cients only one is significant, and hence no evidence for differential effects of risk
between “footloose” industries and those with high degrees of irreversibility
emerges, as would be suggested by the real options theory of investment. 
IV. Conclusions
Capital formation—rather than capital acquisition—is the one aspect of multina-
tional companies’ activities that is most likely to confer the benefits commonly
sought by capital importers. Using cross-country capital expenditure data, this
paper identified determinants of foreign investment that have greater relevance to
multinational activity than those resulting from more commonly conducted empir-
ical studies of foreign direct investment flows. Whereas the former represents a
long-term investment decision, FDI represents a financial flow that is a function
of numerous financial variables.
In essence, affiliate capital formation could be explained on the basis of a
traditional portfolio allocation model. Past profitability or low wage costs show
the expected positive effect; host countries that are perceived as politically risky
Alexander Lehmann









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2deter capital formation. While it is clear that commercially disseminated country
risk ratings have little power in predicting future earnings variability, the results
presented here suggest that such perceptions are indeed relevant in driving actual
investment decisions. By contrast, the improvements in such risk ratings over
recent years have yet to translate into investment decisions. This suggests that
investors’ initial negative perceptions take a long time to overcome, even though
the justification for such risk perceptions in terms of future earnings variability is
questionable at best. On the other hand, a small domestic market need not be an
impediment to foreign investment where open trade regimes allow foreign affili-
ates to access international markets. While trade barriers are often thought to raise
the return on capital—and in many cases are designed to attract such capital—the
positive effect of open markets on foreign investment is still present when only
domestic wage costs, risk, and host country market size are controlled for. 
Using detailed industry-level affiliate data, this study was able therefore to
confirm a number of hypotheses for multinational investors, which often account for
an important share of corporate fixed investment in developing countries. The effects
of regulatory risk on fixed investment are already well established in the empirical
literature on private investment, but have not been conclusively demonstrated in
empirical studies of FDI flows. Consistent investor-side data on affiliate operations
in a large country sample are hard to come by—the U.S. dataset is unique in its
coverage and time span—but a rich set of issues awaits further empirical research. 
The adverse effect of country risk that has been confirmed here comes against
the background of an unprecedented liberalization of investment regimes in devel-
oping countries. The fact that crude perceptions of political and regulatory uncer-
tainty continue to deter fixed capital formation may lend added impetus to the
ongoing multilateral efforts to make national investment regimes more transparent
and predictable. 
APPENDIX
Data Definitions and Data Sources
The derived variables are defined as follows, based on the data series provided by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) at the U.S. Commerce Department, as listed further below:
Country share in net capital formation:
Profit margin:
Return on assets:

































150Published figures for net income (NIN) include indirectly owned foreign affiliates. As sales
(SLS) are for directly owned affiliates only, income had to be corrected to NIND to compute ROS. 
For all variables the numerical suffixes indicate the period over which the variable has
been averaged, for example, 8394 for 1983 to 1994. 
All BEA data have been downloaded from http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/uguide.htm#_1_24. 
Affiliate data refer only to the majority-owned non-bank affiliates of non-bank U.S.
parents and all data items refer to the entire affiliate, that is, including assets held by and income
accruing to host country residents or third parties. All flow data are reported in current U.S.
dollars, converted at the average exchange rate.
Variable 
Name Definition Source
CPX Gross capital expenditures  Capital Expenditures by Affiliates
DEP Depreciation and depletion charges Income of Affiliates
EMP Number of employees Selected Data for Foreign Affiliates
PPQ Net property, plant, and equipment Balance Sheet of Affiliates,
Country by Account
LSL Local sales Sales by Affiliates, Country of Affiliate 
by Destination
NIN Net income of affiliates. This is income  Income Statement of Affiliates
after costs and expenses and foreign 
income taxes. It includes capital gains 
and losses (which are normally less than 
1 percent) and other nonoperating items
NIND NIN minus the sum of capital gains, Income Statement of Affiliates
income from equity investment in other 
affiliates, and income from other 
equity investment
SLS Total sales of directly owned affiliates Sales by Affiliates, Country of Affiliate 
by Destination
WAG Compensation of Employees Selected Data for Foreign Affiliates
Other variables were obtained from the following sources:
Variable 
Name Definition Source
ERISK Economic risk rating for the month of January ICR country risk ratings
PRISK Political risk rating for the month of January ICR country risk ratings
FRISK Financial risk rating for the month of January ICR country risk ratings
GDPS Share in world income, country and world incomes  World Development 
measured at market prices in constant 1987 U.S. dollars Indicators
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